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Defenses to Group Defamation Actions
Richard J. Quigg*
N EXAMINING THE DEFENSES available in group defamation pro-
ceedings, it is first essential to review the defenses that apply
to defamation of the individual. With this as background we can
elaborate on the particular principles that apply to group defa-
mation.
Basic Defenses in Individual Defamation
The defenses available in an action for defamation can be
subdivided into three basic groupings, namely, truth, privilege,
and consent.' These groupings will be discussed separately.
A. Truth
Truth in a defamation case has been generally held to be a
complete defense in the absence of malice.2 This has not always
been the rule; in old common law it was held that truth alone was
not a valid defense, but good motive must also be present. Thus,
where it is said that Jones is "bald as a billiard ball," a libel may
be found despite the fact that Jones has nary a hair on his head.
Early American jurisdictions gradually deviated from the
English concepts, although in early criminal actions an absence
of malice was an essential ingredient.3 Thus, while Mr. Clap,
after posting a sign to the effect that Caleb Hayward was a liar,
a swindler, and a cheat, was willing to prove the truth of these
statements, he was denied the privilege because of the obvious
presence of malice. Much of this reasoning has carried over into
modern criminal cases and is of importance in group defamation
cases, 4 as is discussed below.
* B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute; M.S., Lehigh University (both in
Metallurgical Engineering); Ph.D., Case Institute of Technology; Research
Supervisor, Materials Technology, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Cleveland;
Third year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
I Gaffney v. Scott Pub. Co., 41 Wash. 2d 191, 248 P. 2d 390 (1952).
2 Fairbanks Pub. Co. v. Pitka, 376 P. 2d 190 (Alaska 1962); Sather v. Natl.
Dairy Prod. Co., 233 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1962); Brinkley v. Fishbein, 110 F. 2d 62,
cert. denied 61 S. Ct. 34, 311 U. S. 672, 85 L. Ed. 432 (1940); Fitscher v.
Rollman & Sons, 31 Ohio App. 340, 167 N. E. 469 (1929); Jenkins v. D. X.
Sunray Oil Co., 297 F. 2d 244 (5th Cir. 1962).
3 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 15 Am. Dec. 214 (1825);
Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212 (1809).
4 Beauharnais v. People, 72 S. Ct. 725, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).
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Despite these stated limitations, the defense of truth is
generally a complete one. It does not require proof of the literal
truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies are im-
material, provided that the defamation charged is true in sub-
stance.5 Thus, where it is published that a teacher has been
fired, the fact that it was a forced resignation is academic and
does not preclude the defense of truth.
On the other hand, a partial truth does not justify the entire
libel.6 Also, where truth is interposed as a defense and the publi-
cation is found to be false, legal malice is implied, and the plain-
tiff is entitled to punitive damages.7 Nor does belief in the truth
of a statement, nor anger or passion, constitute a justification or
a defense.8
B. Privilege
Privilege is perhaps the most complex and controversial of
the aspects of the defense to defamation proceedings. Most of
the principles of privilege as applied to individual defamation
also apply to group defamation. In general, privilege can be
divided into two general areas; one the concise, closely defined
concept of absolute privilege, and the second, the broad, some-
what nebulous branch of qualified privilege.
Absolute privilege has been largely restricted to proceedings
of legislative bodies, judicial proceedings, and, to a limited ex-
tent, the communications of military and naval officers.9 The
absolute immunity of legislative bodies has been maintained in
the public eye by the congressional committees of the late
Senators McCarthy and Kefauver, as well as the present hearings
of the committee headed by Senator McClellan. The immunity
of judicial officers and courts has been upheld despite some
flagrant abuses by lower courts10
The subject of qualified privilege is considerably more
flexible, and is one from which substantial litigation has resulted.
5 Sather v. Natl. Dairy Prod. Co., supra n. 2.
6 Holden v. Amer. News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (D. C., D. C.), appeal dism.
144 F. 2d 249 (C. C. A. 9, 1943).
7 Miller, Smith, and Champagne v. Capital City Press, 142 So. 2d 462 (La.
1962).
8 McCuddin v. Dickenson, 226 Iowa 304, 283 N. W. 886 (1939); Stegemann
v. Paulsen, 194 Iowa 1314, 190 N. W. 929 (1922).
9 53 C. J. S. 415-416 (1948); 33 Am. Jur. 123-124 (1941).
10 Karelas v. Baldwin, 237 App. Div. 265, 261 N. Y. S. 518 (1937).
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Several subjects lend themselves quite readily to the concepts of
qualified privilege, including employer-employee relationships,"
slanderous comments concerning the eligibility of a suitor of a
close relative,12 matters of mutual public or business interest,
principal and agent duties, and the like.
What can be considered a qualified privilege for all Ameri-
cans is the basic right of freedom of speech as guaranteed by
the First Amendment of the Constitution, which states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
The clash between literal interpretation of the First Amend-
ment and its interpretation in relation to defamation of the in-
dividual or the group has provided the basis for a number of
stimulating law review articles. 1 Viewpoints have varied from
that of Justice Black, who advocates a concise and literal inter-
pretation of the First Amendment even at the expense of tolera-
tion of occasional seditious libel, to that of Justice Holmes, who
stated that the prohibition against legislation that might limit
free speech was never intended to give immunity to every pos-
sible use or abuse of that freedom.' 4
A specific application of freedom of speech is involved in the
concept of fair comment. In essence, this concept is based upon
the hypothesis that it is a basic right (or qualified privilege) for
one to project his honestly founded opinion. This opinion in some
instances may libel the character or abilities of a public figure or
group and still be a fair comment, defensible under this doc-
trine.15 It is recognized, of course, that justifiable fair comment
as related to an individual may be much narrower than when
related to a large group.
11 Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775 (1891); McKenna v. Mans-
field Leland Hotel Co., 55 Ohio App. 163, 9 N. E. 2d 166 (1936); Johnson v.
Gerasimos, 247 Mich. 248, 225 N. W. 636 (1929).
12 McBride v. LeDoux, 111 La. 398, 35 So. 615, 100 Am. St. R. 491 (1904).
13 Note, Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolute," A Public Inter-
view, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 549 (1962); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 245 (1961); Leflar, The Freeness of Free
Speech, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1073 (1961-1962).
14 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 S. Ct. 249 (1919).
15 Larrick v. Gilloon, 176 Cal. App. 2d 408, 1 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1959).
Jan., 1964
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C. Consent
In general, a person consenting to, or authorizing, the publi-
cation complained of, in a libel action cannot recover for the
injury sustained by reason of such publication. 16 But even
though consent has been given, a significant deviation from what
has been consented to, such as an inaccurate portrayal in a
movie, may result in an actionable tort.17
Specific Aspects of Defense in Group Defamation
A valid defense to a group defamation action may be com-
posed of any of the aforementioned elements of defense. Group
defamation, however, is unique in a number of aspects, which
may be summarized by three general words, semantics, statistics,
and politics. In the following, each of these special aspects of
group defamation is examined, considering both tort and criminal
liability.
A. Semantics
In most cases over a period of years, it has been held that the
word "all" or its equivalent must be included in the defama-
tory statement in order for an individual to successfully sustain
an action for defamation. As stated in Fowler v. Curtis,8 a
defamatory statement, to be actionable, must apply to every
member of a group without exception.19 In certain cases it has
been held that an imputation of gross immorality to some of a
small group casts suspicion on all, where no attempt is made to
exclude the innocent.2 0 Thus, where it is stated that "most (of
members of a group numbering twenty-five) * * * are fairies," an
action is said to lie despite the lack of an encompassing word
such as "all."
In general, the defamatory statement must refer to the plain-
tiff as an ascertainable person,2 ' although in at least one instance
the court permitted witnesses to testify that in their minds the
16 Watwood v. Credit Bureau, 97 A. 2d 460 (Mun. App. D. C. 1953).
17 Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. C. Mass. 1948).
18 Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., D. C., 78 F. Supp. 303, 182 F. 2d 377 (App.
D. C. 1950).
19 Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S. W. 2d 411, 97 A. L. R. 277
(1934).
20 Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F. 311 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
21 Service Parking Corp. v. Washington Times, 67 App. D. C. 351, 92 F. 2d
502 (1937).
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published matter definitely singled out the plaintiff.22 In most
jurisdictions words not clearly encompassing an entire group, nor
specifically designating the plaintiff, do not result in a cause of
action. A slight deviation was presented in Gross v. Cantor,
where it was stated that all but one (out of twelve) of the radio
editors in New York City were -23 The exception was
clearly identifiable; hence, the "all" rule could still be applied.
In most instances innuendos, or indications that "one apple out of
a barrel is rotten," have not been found to be actionable unless
the plaintiff can clearly show that the public at large definitely
associates the allegation with him.24
B. Statistics
In general, tort actions for defamation have been upheld
where the group is small, and rejected where the group is large.
Thus, in the famous Neiman-Marcus case, all members of groups
of 9 and 25 persons were held to have an action for defamation;
but a group of 382 was too large.25 In other important cases
defamation to a group of 8,26 11,27 1228 and 1229 were held to be
actionable. On the other hand, groups of 2330, 20-30 (or 10-12
depending on interpretation),31 or 6032 were held to be too large
for the support of a tort action for defamation. Generally it
appears that the group defamed must not be larger than twenty
if defamation actions by its members are to be looked upon
favorably by the courts.
The classic thinking of the courts over a period of years,
with respect to semantics and statistics, was expressed well in
Ewell v. Boutwell where it was stated: 33
22 Marr v. Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 246 P. 2d 509 (1952); Note, 41 Calif. L. Rev.
144 (1953).
23 Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93, 200 N. E. 592 (1936).
24 Watts-Wagner Co. v. General Motors, 64 F. Supp. 506 (D. C. N. Y. 1945);
Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N. E. 2d 553 (1947).
25 Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, supra n. 20.
26 Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Assn., 184 N. Y. 479, 77 N. E. 660 (1906).
27 Bornmann v. Star Co., 174 N. Y. 212, 66 N. E. 723 (1903).
28 Hardy v. Williamson, 86 Ga. 551, 12 S. E. 874 (1891).
29 Gross v. Cantor, supra n. 23.
30 Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., supra n. 24.
31 Service Parking v. Washington Times, supra n. 21.
32 Fowler v. Curtis Publ. Co., supra n. 18.
83 Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 121 S. E. 912 (1924).
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1. If defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a
general class of persons and there is nothing that points, or
by colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a par-
ticular member thereof, such member has no right of action.
2. But if language is employed toward a comparatively small
group of persons, or a restricted or local portion of a general
class and is so framed as to make defamatory imputations
against all members of the small or restricted group, any
member thereof may sue.
3. On the other hand, if the words used in respect to the
small or restricted group expressly, but impersonally and
indefinitely, refer to one or more of the several members
thereof, one of the members in order to maintain his action,
must establish the application of the language to himself.
Thus, as a defense to a group defamation action, where the
language is vague and not inclusive, or in no way singles out the
plaintiff, or where the group maligned is large (say, larger than
twenty), a demurrer or a motion to dismiss the action is in order.
It would not appear to be necessary, according to most past
precedents, to utilize any of the basic defenses to individual
defamation, such as truth, privilege, fair comment, or consent.
C. Politics
There has been a tendency of legislatures since World War II
to enact "group hate" statutes, which make it a criminal offense to
publish or distribute any literature which tends to expose any
group or class of persons to ridicule or contempt. These statutes
presumably are motivated by outrage at the tactics utilized by the
Nazis in Germany toward minority groups, particularly the Jews,
or out of sympathy with the drive of certain minority or ethnic
groups to attain equality of treatment. In other words, these
statutes appear to be largely sociological or political in motivation,
although they may be guised as attempts to prevent riots or
violence. Some states have enacted essentially toothless statutes
incapable of any serious enforcement, largely to align their
sympathy with the cause of the maligned minority group, as
opposed to the hatemongers.3 4 Other states, Illinois and Indiana,
for example, have enacted laws which may be enforceable. 35
34 Note, 61 Yale L. J. 252 (1952).
35 Ibid.
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The leading case on this subject, People v. Beauharnais,30
is an outgrowth of an Illinois statute37 which reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to manufacture, sell or offer for sale, advertise or publish,
present or exhibit in any public place in this state any
lithograph, moving picture, play, drama, or sketch, which
publication or exhibition portrays depravity, immorality,
unchastity or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race,
color, creed, or religion which said publication or exhibit
exposes to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which produces
breach of the peace or riots.
People v. Beauharnais does not present an entirely new
concept in Illinois. A prior criminal case had held that, since
libel of a class or group has as great a tendency to provoke breach
of the peace or to disturb society as has libel of an individual,
such libel is punishable even though its application to individual
members of a class or group cannot be proved.38 In general,
other states have controverted this concept.39
The facts of the People v. Beauharnais case are as follows:
Beauharnais, a member of a "white citizens' group" de-
signed to suppress the movements of Negroes into previously all-
white neighborhoods, was arrested while peaceably passing out
literature which labeled the Negro an inferior being, citing
criminal statistics and other matter. Beauharnais was convicted
and fined. On appeal to the Supreme Court, his conviction was
upheld by a 5-4 vote.
Beauharnais' defenses were roughly as follows:
1. Truth,
2. Freedom of speech and fair comment,
3. Law too vague to support conviction.
Truth was held to be no defense unless it was shown that a
valid motive for publication existed. The other defenses were
also rejected by the majority of the court.
This verdict was criticized by a number of authorities, who,
while obviously not sympathetic with the special cause of Beau-
harnais, felt that the enforcement of this statute in this manner
was an infringement on the basic right of free speech as guaran-
36 Beauharnais v. People, supra n. 4.
37 Ill. Crim. Code Sec. 224A Div., Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, Sec. 471 (1949).
38 People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N. E. 466 (1925).
39 People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (1938).
Jan., 1964
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teed by the First Amendment to the Constitution" (the First
Amendment being applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment). Extrapolations of this decision could make
statements pertaining to the functions of the Germans in the
Nazi party, or of the Italians in the Mafia, while obviously true,
actionable as criminal defamation, by zealous enforcement. The
overall impact of such decisions could not help but ultimately
infringe upon the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech.
Further discussion of the defense of truth is warranted. Al-
though truth has never been a complete defense, in itself, to
a criminal charge of defamation, it nevertheless represents a valid
defense in the absence of malice. Thus, if a basic defense of truth
were to be accepted in a case such as this, where the group
is extremely large, a defense counsel must resort to statistical
concepts.
In statistical sampling the significance of a given sample size
is directly related to the total population.4 1 Thus, where a group
of sixty people is to be examined, a sample size of thirty, if ran-
domly selected, would provide a good measure of the distribution
of the total population. However, with an infinitely large popula-
tion, such as would be encountered in the defamation of an ethnic
group, any standard deviation obtained on a random sample de-
signed to prove truth as an affirmative defense must be multiplied
by a factor to correct for the sample size. Thus, statistical signifi-
cance in an infinitely large population is difficult to establish on
anything but a large sample. Hence, in the absence of heavy fi-
nancial backing, statistical significance cannot be employed to es-
tablish truth where a large segment of the population has been
defamed.
Occasionally, truth can be established by using existing sur-
veys. If, for example, it is stated, "College students of Russian
background are drunks," a survey already run has indicated that
some basic truth could be established in such a statement.4 2
The aforementioned examples are intended to show that
even if truth is accepted as a defense, its application to group
defamation of large groups is difficult. Thus, the best defense
to such an action is to emphasize the basic tenets of the First
40 Note, 61 Yale L. J. 252 (1952); Note, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 549 (1962).
41 Wilks, Elementary Statistical Analysis, 179-185 (Princeton Univ. Press
1949).
42 Straus and Bacon, Drinking in College, 53 (Yale Univ. Press 1953).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/11
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
Amendment and the concepts of fair comment. It would appear
that these defenses would be upheld in a less emotional issue
than that presented by the Beauharnais case.
Summary
The basic defenses applicable to ordinary individual defama-
tion, of truth, privilege (including fair comment), and consent,
also apply to group defamation. Most past group defamation cases
have held that language including all members of a given group,
or positively identifying the plaintiff, must be used. Tort actions
have been upheld when small groups are defamed; tort claims
are generally disallowed in the defamation of large groups unless
the public readily recognizes the defamation as being directed at
one individual.
A number of "group-hate" statutes have been enacted by
various states, making it a criminal offense to defame a class of
citizens. Defenses based on truth are difficult to establish
because of the statistical complications encountered in groups
of large numbers. The best defense to these statutes appears to
be based on fair comment and the constitutional guarantees of
the First Amendment.
Jan., 1964
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